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Abstract. Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman contend that ‘vague projects’
motivate radical revisions to orthodox, utility-maximising rational choice the-
ory. Their argument cannot succeed if such projects merely ground instances
of the paradox of the sorites, or heap. Tenenbaum and Raffman are not blind to
this, and argue that Warren Quinn’s Puzzle of the Self-Torturer does not rest on
the sorites. I argue that their argument both fails to generalise to most vague
projects, and is ineffective in the case of the Self-Torturer itself.
1 Self-Torture and Rational Choice
We often attach value (utility) to vague projects which—like ‘is a heap’—lack precise satis-
faction conditions, but such projects engender puzzles for rational choice theory. You may
wish for a restful night’s sleep, but to stay up as late as possible consistent with that. Since
restful is vague, one minute of sleep apparently couldn’t make the difference between a rest-
ful and a non-restful night, and you ought to stay up for another minute. But foreseeably,
if you keep thinking that way, you will stay up all night. To get a restful night, you must
at some point reject such momentary calculations. But simply saying ‘don’t even go down
that road’ is a bad response to this puzzle: you would never leave your bed.
The challenge is to balance orweigh your competing goals. Philosophers—most recently
Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman1—have argued that orthodox utility-maximising ra-
*For comments and discussion, I am indebted to several anonymous reviewers, John Broome, Ryan Doody,
Thomas Hofweber, Brad Hooker, Douglas MacLean, Katherine Meehan, Julia Nefsky, Ram Neta, David Oder-
berg, C.D.C. Reeve, John Roberts, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Keith Simmons, Susan Wolf, and audiences at the
North Carolina Philosophical Society, Chapel Hill, Reading, and York.
1Tenenbaum and Raffman (2012).
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tional choice theory cannot do so, and that it fails under conditions of vagueness. In this
paper, I defend orthodoxy against Tenenbaum and Raffman’s argument.
Their argument appeals to a classic of this genre, Warren Quinn’s Puzzle of the Self-
Torturer, which I restate only briefly here:2
Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. A torture device is attached irreversibly to a per-
son ‘ST’. The device has a dial—currently set to 0, with settings up to 1,000—
which can only be turned up, in single increments, every week; each turn of the
dial permanently increases the amount of electricity running through ST’s body.
The difference between adjacent settings is very small, but higher settings are
agonising. Every time she turns the dial, ST gets $10,000.
In the original puzzle, ‘the self-torturer cannot feel any difference in comfort between
adjacent settings …[and] …appears to have a clear and repeatable reason to increase the
voltage each week’.3 A natural question is how putatively imperceptible differences in elec-
trical current could amount to severe differences in pain. But our main problem—that of
vague projects—arises even if each setting is perceptibly but slightly more painful than the
previous one. With the right preferences, even fairly severe lifelong pain could be ‘worth’
$10,000. We set aside questions of imperceptibility for the moment, and return to them
later.
Now, if ST has turned the dial k times, she must decide whether to advance to setting
(k+1). Orthodoxy says she must: doesn’t the utility from $10,000 outweigh the disutility of
a small increase in electric current? Since k was arbitrary, by parity of reasoning, she must
advance to the end. ST indeed seems to have ‘clear and repeatable reason’ to turn the dial
each week.
But this is foreseeably the route to disaster. If ST is like most of us, she would far
rather turn the dial ten times and gain $100,000, than advance all the way into agony. Utility
maximization has led him astray. This seems to show that you do better by deviating from
a central tenet of orthodoxy:
Tenet. At every choice point, act to maximize (expected) utility.
2See Quinn (1990), especially p. 79, for the canonical presentation.
3Quinn (1990), p. 79.
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That is the Puzzle: ST seems always required by Tenet to advance one more stage.
But she can see that if she continues to do so, she will eventually disprefer the outcome.
Similarly, you would prefer to get 7.5 hours of sleep and feel rested, but Tenet apparently
keeps you up all night. And if we do better by disobeying Tenet, how can an account of
rational choice that includes it be correct?
2 Heterodox Views
On this basis, many philosophers defend strikingly heterodox accounts of rational choice.
Quinn himself argued that the Self-Torturer has genuinely intransitive preferences, and
that the Puzzle ‘reveals a quasi-deontological aspect to a fully adequate theory of rational
choice’.4
More recently, Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman have argued that Tenet does not
apply to vague projects, including ST’s goal of avoiding pain:
Wepropose that a vague project issues in a requirement and a set of permissions.
The requirement is just an instance of the instrumental requirement: insofar as
one is rational one must adopt (what one believes to be) the means (including
constitutive means) necessary to execute one’s project. The permissions are per-
missions to execute the project in some momentary actions rather than simply
maximizing utility in light of one’s preferences for momentary actions consid-
ered in isolation.5
They argue that a refusal by ST to turn the dial cannot be justified on the grounds of
utility, but ‘the pain-free life project issues permission to stop turning the dial, indepen-
dently of what maximises utility in light of ST’s momentary preferences’. Even if utility is
maximized by advancing one stage, ST has permission to refuse.6 Sometimes, even though
it would maximize utility for ST to turn the dial now, she is rationally permitted (perhaps
required) to refrain. Utilities do not serve as a guide to life:
4Quinn (1990), p. 87.
5Tenenbaum and Raffman (2012); p. 102.
6Tenenbaum and Raffman (2012), p. 106.
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By reflecting on the nature of vague projects, we learn that in such cases we
cannot simply plugweights in to various ends to generate a preference-ordering;
rationality is not always purely calculative.7
Clearly, this view is supported by the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer only if utility-
maximisation indeed fails in that case, by leading ST to disaster.
Since these cases hang on vagueness, a natural thought is that they are somehow in-
stances of the paradox of the sorites, or heap. In that paradox, it is compelling that removing
one grain from a heap of sand leaves a non-heap: that if n grains form a heap, then (n-1)
grains form a heap. But if 10,000 grains form a heap, this implies (via repeated modus
ponens) that five grains form a heap, even in contexts where this is clearly false. Such rea-
soning is a sorites on ‘is a heap’. It is vague where we tip from a heap into a non-heap, and
this renders the predicate ‘sorites-embeddable’. Sorites hang on tolerance principles such
as ‘one grain couldn’t be the difference between a heap and a non-heap’; tolerance princi-
ples (at least in their universally quantified forms) are widely agreed to be false, though
compelling.
Theories of vagueness fall into two broad camps. Indeterminists claim that there is an
indeterminate minimum number of grains required for a heap, perhaps because meaning
depends on use and our use has not fixed a precise threshold. The relevant tolerance prin-
ciple has a false instance, but it is indeterminate which. On epistemic views, some instance
of the tolerance principle is determinately false, but we don’t (perhaps can’t) know which.8
It is common ground that universally quantified tolerance principles are false: one of their
instances is false, but it is indeterminate or unknowable which.
If the Puzzle is simply an instance of the sorites, then the challenge to orthodox rational
choice theory is liable to dissolve. If claims such as that turning the dial is always required
on utility-maximising grounds, and that ST has ‘clear and repeatable reason’ to turn the
dial—which are at the heart of the putative counterexample to orthodoxy—are equivalent
to a a tolerance principle, then they are false.
Of course, Tenenbaum and Raffman are not blind to the challenge of the sorites. But
in their long and rich paper, they mention the paradox only once:
7Tenenbaum and Raffman (2012), p. 111.
8For indeterminism, see Fine (1975), Keefe (2000), Dorr (2003), and Barnes (2010). For epistemicism, see
Sorensen (1988) and Williamson (1994). The ‘tolerance’ terminology is due to Wright (1975).
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Readers familiar with the sorites paradoxmaywonderwhether the self-torturer
puzzle is just an especially picturesque instance of it: perhaps ST is proceeding
along a sorites series of pains from a clearly bearable one to a clearly unbearable
one, attempting to decide where the bearable ones end and the unbearable be-
gin. However, this way of thinking about ST overlooks a crucial element of her
situation: at each step of the way she is also trying to decide whether a certain
incremental difference in pain can be compensated by $10,000 at that point in
the spectrum of her pain. The latter task is what appears to put pressure on her
rationality and is, at bottom, the source of the puzzle.9
This argument involves two claims: that vague projects involve distinctively compara-
tive tasks, and that they therefore cannot be seen as a sorites. In the next sections, I’ll argue
that neither stands up to scrutiny.
3 The Shepherd in a Practical Sorites
The quoted argument appeals to distinctive features of ST’s situation which put ’pressure
on her rationality’. But since Tenenbaum and Raffman are defending a general thesis that
vague projects are exceptions to orthodox rational choice theory, an appeal to distinctive fea-
tures of one particular case of vagueness—such as the ‘comparative’ nature of ST’s plight—
is a non-sequitur. Indeed, many of the vague projects they discuss—such as that of writing
a book—do involve trying to decide where the books end and the non-books begin, and are
akin to that of sleeping restfully.
In this section, I’ll argue that the decision-theoretic puzzles arising from such non-
comparative cases are most naturally seen as sorites. The challenge of vagueness was first
articulated by Richard Tuck, in a somewhat overlooked example:
He could be a shepherd who wishes to build a cairn of stones by himself to
guide him in the hills. On setting out in the morning, he can reason as follows.
If I work all day, I will have a suitable pile of stones by nightfall. But one stone
added to a collection of other stones makes a negligible difference – it can never
9Tenenbaum and Raffman (2012), p. 88 fn. 3.
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be enough to tip it over the edge and into a heap. It takes a certain amount of
time and effort to find a spare stone. If I do not start immediately, I will still
have a heap of stones at nightfall, since the stone I could have picked up in
the next few minutes would have made no difference to the outcome. But the
same applies to the next stone, and the next: there is no point in ever beginning.
Moreover, at some time in the day it will be clear that I have passed the stage
where I will have enough time to build a cairn, and after that point there is
certainly no benefit to be gained by piling up stones.10
Once again, it appears that utility-maximisation foreseeably leads to a dispreferred
outcome, since the shepherd will not build a cairn. Maximisation seems to prevent him
from starting the job.
To bring out how vagueness impacts the shepherd’s predicament, consider how his
situation looks when made artificially precise:
The precise cairn-builder. Another shepherd, John, will get 200 utils from
building a cairn by nightfall. A cairn consists of 15 stones; once he starts build-
ing, he cannot stop. Each stone takes 30 minutes to move, and costs 4 utils (he
will miss one episode of his favourite television show). He has ten hours before
nightfall; the cairn will be useless if not completed by then.
Intuitively, it is clear that John ought to enjoy 2.5 hours of television, and then build a
cairn with precisely 15 stones before nightfall. He will gain 140 utils: 200 utils for the cairn,
minus 60 utils from moving 15 stones. (We set aside questions about whether it is really
rational for him to leave it to the last minute like this, without setting aside a ‘margin of
safety’, which form a different set of issues.)
If John starts earlier or later, then he is irrational: either he fails to build a cairn, or
he piles up an excessive number of stones, to no additional benefit. Starting late and then
building a partial cairn is clearly the worst strategy. He not only gets no value from a partial
cairn, but also loses value from the television programmes he misses, for no compensating
benefit. If he has left it too late to build a cairn, then he should not start.
10See Tuck (1979) p. 154. Cairns are heaps of rocks or stones, often used to mark mountain trails.
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As expected, Tenet explains each of these judgements. Every thirty minutes, John
must start moving stones, or wait. If he has already waited k stages of thirty minutes, then
applying Tenet, he ought to wait for stage (k+1) just in case utility is maximized by doing so.
In utility terms, stage (k+1) differs from k in just two relevant ways—more leisure time, and
one less stone on the cairn.
Stage (k+1) always involves more leisure time; (k+1) is worse in cairn-terms only if the
cairn can be built at k, but not at (k+1). Utility is maximized by waiting for (k+1) rather than
starting to build at k, unless the cairn is buildable at k but not at (k+1).11 And ‘the cairn is
buildable at k but not at (k+1)’ is false at all points except one—the point when there is
enough time left to carry exactly 15 stones. In this precise case, Tenet correctly requires that
John start work at the last point when he can still finish the cairn by nightfall.
But what about the original, vague case? As Tuck notes, this case is clearly parasitic on
the vagueness of ‘is a cairn’, which is sorites-embeddable. The relevant tolerance principle
is:
(Cairn-Tolerance) If n stones form a cairn, then (n-1) stones form a cairn.
We thus get a sorites series: 20 stones form a cairn; if 20 stones form a cairn, then 19
stones form a cairn; … if 6 stones form a cairn, then 5 stones form a cairn. But, 5 stones do
not form a cairn. Since it is better to build a cairn with fewer stones if possible, we also get
a sorites on ‘better’:
It is better for John to build with 19 stones than 20;
If 19 stones are better than 20, then 18 are better than 19;
…
If 6 stones are better than 7, then 5 are better than 6.
I use ‘better’ subjectively, to mean that an option is preferable utility-wise. By the
transitivity of ‘better’ on such a characterisation, and via a sorites series, we reach the false
11I’m assuming here that the following situation does not obtain: stage 2 is worse than stage 1, but stage 3 is
better than both stage 2 and stage 1. Such ‘darker before the dawn’ cases are a little more complicated, but not
fundamentally different.
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conclusion that it is better for John to build with 5 stones than with 20. This is how the
cairn-builder is caught in a sorites series.
We may call this a practical sorites. Unlike the standard ‘theoretical’ case, John cannot
simplywithhold judgement, or say ‘it’s borderline’: hemust act according to the application
of a predicate. Is this the minimum number of stones required for a cairn, or not?
Instances of the tolerance principle (Cairn-Tolerance) fall into three groups. For high
numbers of stones (clear cairns), it is clearly true. In a third group, with low numbers of
stones (clear non-cairns), (Cairn-Tolerance) has a false antecedent and is clearly true. In
between, (Cairn-Tolerance) has a false instance. So much is common ground between the
precise and the vague cases.
But when it is vague which instance is false, the central instance becomes a penumbra,
where there are borderline-cairns composed of middling numbers of stones. Here instances
of the principle are borderline, construed neutrally between indeterminism and epistemi-
cism: indeterminate or unknowable. Whatever the theory of vagueness, the tolerance prin-
ciple (Cairn-Tolerance) has a false instance in this penumbra.
We can now see that Tenenbaum and Raffman’s argument doesn’t support the general
thesis that vague projects do not engender sorites. The shepherd is ‘proceeding along a
sorites series of [piles of rocks] from a [clear cairn] to a [clear non-cairn], attempting to
decide where the [cairns] end and the [non-cairns] begin’. Some vague projects can be seen
as sorites.
4 The Self-Torturer as Practical Sorites
But utility-maximization is a general theory, and just one counterexample would falsify it.
Even if Tenenbaum and Raffman are wrong about many other vague projects, what about
their argument that the sorites could not be ‘the source of the puzzle’ for ST?
It has some force. In the paradox of the heap, 1,000,000 grains form a heap, and if n
grains form a heap, then (n-1) grains form a heap. The Self-Torturer doesn’t seem to be like
this. What predicate corresponds to ‘is a heap’? They imply that it would be something like
‘is a bearable level of pain’. A sorites on this predicate would, as they rightly say, misdescribe
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the puzzle. ST ismaking a comparative judgement—is this additional painworth $10,000?—
which doesn’t seem reducible to a fruitless search for the edge of a predicate’s extension.
But it is a mistake to think that a sorites account of the Self-Torturer must have this
form. It is not quite explicit that Tenenbaum and Raffman do think this, but if not, then their
argument ismanifestly ineffective. A rational ST is certainly not looking for the last bearable
pain: intuitively, she should stop long before that point. If there is a sorites here, it is not one
on a predicate like ‘is a bearable level of pain’, but on something more comparative: is this
pain increment worth this money increment? In focusing on non-comparative predicates,
Tenenbaum and Raffman underplay the resources of the sorites view.
Further consideration of the shepherd’s case suggests how ST may also be caught in a
sorites. The shepherd is actually performing both of the tasks distinguished by Tenenbaum
andRaffman. He is proceeding along a sorites series of [piles of rocks] from a [clear cairn] to
a [clear non-cairn], attempting to decide where the [cairns] end and the [non-cairns] begin;
he is also trying to decidewhether a certain incremental difference in [the number of stones]
can be compensated by [extra leisure time] at that point in the spectrum of [stones].
For the shepherd, the outcome of the latter ‘comparative’ task is determined by that of
the former ‘categorical’ task. Tenenbaum and Raffman are correct that ST doesn’t seem to
face such a categorical task. But their mistake is to think that therefore the case cannot be
seen as a sorites: we can exhibit a sorites ‘directly’ on the comparative task.
4.1 Two Kinds of Vague Project
To do show that ST is caught in a sorites, I wish to introduce a distinction between two kinds
of desires, or projects. First:
Binary desire. A binary desire that a is F is unsatisfied if a is not F, and satisfied if a is F.
Binary desires divideworlds or states of affairs into those where they are satisfied, and
those where they aren’t. My desire to go to Churchill, Manitoba, and see the polar bears, is
binary: it is satisfied in worlds where I go, and unsatisfied in worlds where I do not. The
desire for a cairn is similarly binary, despite its vagueness: the shepherd’s desire is satisfied
iff he has a cairn. Your desire for a restful night’s sleep is also binary and vague.
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But some desires are not like this:
Essentially comparative desire. An essentially comparative desire is for things that are more
F rather than less F. There is no ‘Fness threshold’ beyond which adding Fness is not
desired.
Essentially comparative desires do not divide worlds, but rank them. Instead of desir-
ing to see a polar bear, I might prefer to see larger mammals over smaller ones. I prefer
seeing an elephant to seeing a polar bear, to seeing a Scottish Wildcat. One cannot say out-
right whether such a desire has been satisfied—satisfied compared to what?
The shepherd’s desire to watch more television is comparative, as are ST’s desires for
more money and less pain, and your desire for more wakingminutes. In the rational choice
literature, comparative desires or projects are oftenmarkedwith phrases like ‘utilities linear
in dollars’.12
Crucially, in the essentially comparative case, given a situation, there is both a better
and a worse situation. For some amount of money, there is a preferred (all else being equal)
situation where you have more, and a dispreferred (all else being equal) situation where
you have less. (Perhaps this is not so in extreme cases: one might be genuinely indifferent
between one trillion and two trillion dollars, given actual facts about the world.)
This distinction explains a structural difference between the cairn-builder and the Self-
Torturer. If the shepherdwaits too long, then he ought towatchmore television, and at least
salvage something of the day, since he gets no utility from a partial cairn. Thus he seems to
pass gradually from ‘there’s no point starting now—it would be overkill’ to ‘there’s no point
starting now—it’s too late’. The shepherd’s binary desire for a cairn becomes rationally inert
once it can no longer be satisfied.
But we would not say that once ST ‘has gone too far’ and regrets turning the dial so
many times, she ought to keep taking the deal. That would just make things worse. Even
once ST has passed the optimum trade-off of pain and money, there are many settings that
are clearly worse, with respect to her essentially comparative desire for less pain.
12See, for example, Elga (2010) p. 4.
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4.2 A Model of a Self-Torture Sorites
Now, we can construct a model of ST’s plight as a sorites series. Our main aim is to use
a minimal set of assumptions to adequately explain the key features of the Puzzle, and to
show that the comparative structure identified by Tenenbaum and Raffman is no barrier to
seeing the case as a sorites.
Again, let’s imagine a fully precise version of the puzzle. From Quinn’s description,
we obtain several intuitively plausible constraints:
(I) ST cares only about money and pain: her net utility is the sum of the utility of the
money and the disutility of the pain. At setting zero, she has none of either, so her net
utility is zero.
(II) The marginal utility of taking the deal is initially positive: at setting 2 with $20,000,
for example, ST’s net utility is positive. This is plausible, and implicit in Quinn’s
discussion of filtered series.13
(III) ST eventually has negative total utility, since she prefers setting zero to some later
stages.
For precise utility functions, then, here is how we might graph ST’s utility:
This graph might need some justification. Here I have for ease of presentation treated
machine settings as continuous rather than discrete (this is wholly unrealistic, but does not
substantially affect the case). Money utility ismodelled as 5 timesmachine-setting, and pain
disutility is modelled as approximately 1.333 raised to the power of the machine setting.14
These functions are arbitrary, but other utility functions which respect constraints (I)-(III)
will—assuming no gross discontinuity—generate a graph with a similar structure.
We now see that when ST crosses from zone 1 (where the slope of the money-utility
line exceeds that of the pain-disutility line) into zone 3 (where the relative slopes are re-
versed), there is a point—call it zone 2— where the net-utility line peaks and then turns
down. (Since earlier dial-turns have positive marginal utility, but later ones negative, her
utility functions for machine-settings and for money cannot both be linear.15) After this, the
13Quinn (1990), p. 86.
14More precisely, the pain-utility function is e to the power of (W(50)x/10), which is chosen for neatness: ST
ought stop at setting 10.
15I am grateful to Richard Yetter Chappell for forcing me to be clear on this point.
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Figure 1: The precise Self-Torturer’s utility functions.
relative gradients change, and advancing further—into zone 3—decreases net utility. Here
the slope of the pain-line exceeds that of the money-line.
We are most interested in the point where net utility ‘tops out’ (zone 2), where the
difference between accumulated money-utility and pain-utility is maximized. Clearly, ST
ought stop here, and orthodoxy explains this. Suppose utility is maximized at setting 10, as
it is on the graph above. Before that point, the marginal utility of turning the dial is positive;
but at stage 10, marginal disutility of the extra pain at stage 11 outweighs themarginal utility
of the extra money, and turning the dial is impermissible. Orthodox utility-maximization
correctly mandates that ST accept the deal until setting 10—the point with the highest net
utility—and then stop.
In this precise version, ST should, according to both intuition and Tenet, stop at stage
10, maximizing utility. Unlike in the precise shepherd case, there is nothing akin to the last
stage at which a cairn is buildable. Here there is no simple categorical project that we can
‘look through’ to, so we must speak directly in terms of weighting ST’s two projects, of less
pain and more money. Nevertheless, the orthodox view renders the correct verdict.
In a vague version of the Self-Torturer, ST’s utility functions are vague: it is vague at
what setting the slope of the pain-line overtakes that of themoney-line. Speakingmetaphor-
12
ically, zone 2 is ‘smeared’ into a region, just as the zone ofwhere a cairn becomes a non-cairn
is smeared.
We thus get a sorites on ‘maximises utility’: for low settings (zone 1), it is false that
utility is maximized; in a penumbra (zone 2), it is vague whether utility is maximized; later
(zone 3), it is again false. The tolerance principle is:
Torturer-Tolerance. If setting k does not maximize utility, then setting (k+1) does not max-
imize utility.
This formulation is a material conditional, so it is true except at that point when the
pain-utility begins to dominate money-utility (where the derivative/slope of the former
overtakes that of the latter). The tolerance principle is false only at that point at which
utility is maximised; I’ll argue that there is such a point—though its location may be vague.
As we saw, the difference between the binary and essentially comparative desires ex-
plains how one ought behave once one has already ‘gone too far’.
In zone 1, it is determinately true that the marginal utility of turning the dial is posi-
tive: the net-utility line has a clearly positive slope. In zone 2, it is borderline whether the
marginal utility of turning the dial is positive or negative. In zone 3, the marginal utility of
turning the dial is clearly negative: each stage is worse than the previous.
Thus we can explain why once ST has proceeded too far, into zone 3, repeatedly ad-
vancing is clearly disadvantageous. In the binary cairn builder case, the net utility slope
‘after the borderline zone’, so to speak, is positive. In the comparative self-torture case, it is
negative.
The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer is only superficially simple: besides the imperceptibility
we have set aside, it requires a non-trivial strategy of ST: stopwhen the derivative of her pain-
utility function exceeds that of her money-utility function. This opaque structure grounds
an objection: why believe Torturer-Tolerance? It’s not as intuitively compelling as ‘if k grains
are a heap, then (k-1) grains are a heap’. But the sorites story works only if the principle is
plausible enough to explain the judgement that each particular stage is preferable to the
previous one.16
16I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer.
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The first response to this objection is to dodge it: we do find such a judgement
compelling—otherwise the Self-Torturer scenario wouldn’t be so troubling—and in this
sorites, Torturer-Tolerance is equivalent to that judgement. So the compelling plausibility
of the judgement/tolerance principle is agreed background.
But we might hope that a theory of vague projects would explain the claim’s plausi-
bility, not just appeal to it. The plausibility of tolerance principles is an important question
in theorising about vagueness. In the original paradox, for example, when we imagine that
the penumbra is about 100 grains ‘wide’, we can imagine why the relevant tolerance prin-
ciple is compelling: for any particular grain, it seems incredible that that grain could be the
cut-off. By parity of reasoning, so it seems for any grain.
We might say something similar here. Plausibly, our preferences are not completely
determinate and knowable, and it is vague which setting is optimum, or where pain begins
to outweigh money, so to speak. Anyone who accepts this, and the structural constraints on
the Puzzle in the precise case, must accept that zone 2—where utility is maximised, which
depends on our preferences—will be a penumbra rather than a point. Given that there are a
thousand settings on the device, this penumbra may be rather wide: for any setting therein,
it seems incredible that that setting is the tipping-point. After all, the penumbra of ‘is a cairn’
only perhaps five stones ‘wide’, and that was sufficient to ground a sorites.
With this machinery, we can somewhat artificially cast ST’s plight in non-comparative
terms. Though she is not ‘proceeding along a sorites series of pains from a clearly bearable
one to a clearly unbearable one, attempting to decide where the bearable ones end and
the unbearable begin’, ST is proceeding along a sorites series of dial-turns from those with
clearly positive marginal utility to those with clearly negative marginal utility, attempting
to decide where the positive/required ones end and the negative/impermissible begin.
5 Conclusion
If the foregoing is correct, then Tenenbaum and Raffman’s case for heterodoxy is under-
mined.
It is false that the shepherd always maximises utility by waiting, and thus false that
orthodox rational choice theory condemns him to never building the cairn. Those claims
14
are equivalent to the principle (Cairn-Tolerance), since he always ought wait iff no stone
makes the difference between a cairn and a non-cairn. Given that such tolerance principles
are false, orthodox rational choice theory does not so condemn him, and his predicament
doesn’t falsify the orthodox view.
And since Torturer-Tolerance has a false instance, there is a k such that setting k doesn’t
maximise utility, but setting (k+1) does. According to orthodox rational choice theory, ST
ought turn the dial to setting (k+1) and no further. The decision-theoretic constraints are
similar to the precise case, except that k is vague: indeterminate or unknowable.
Since the universally-quantified tolerance principle is equivalent (given our plausible
constraints about the structure of the puzzle) to the claim that ST always maximizes utility
by turning the dial, we know that the latter is false. The central challenge of the Puzzle was
this: can we reconcile the intuitive need to stop before somewhere with the apparent utility-
maximizing requirement to advance at every point? But since the Puzzle is a sorites, there
is no such requirement, and heterodox ‘permissions’ to diverge from utility considerations
are otiose.
This line of argument, of course, hangs on the falsity of universally-quantified toler-
ance principles, which could be denied. The argument is therefore conditional on the truth
what we might call a ‘tolerance-denying’ account of vagueness.17 But such accounts are
both overwhelmingly plausible and overwhelmingly popular. In any case, doubts here do
nothing to support Tenenbaum and Raffman’s argument that vague projects do not ground
sorites.
If seeing the case as a sorites undermines the motivation for heterodox views, can it
contribute a positive story? A full account is beyond the scope of this paper, but here we
may sketch an orthodox, utility-maximising explanation of the key intuitive facts about ST:
she ought to turn the dial a few times and then stop; she is rational if and only if she stops
in some central zone: the borderline zone 2.
Epistemicists can easily explain this, as a mere case of action under ignorance (in this
case, of her own preferences).
Indeterminists can also show that the borderline-zone is the only rationally permissible
place for ST to stop advancing, and that no point therein is determinately preferable to any
17I’m grateful to Julia Nefsky for discussion of this point.
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other.
At each setting in zone 2, it is indeterminate whether utility is maximised. In that
zone, somewhere but indeterminately where, the slope of the pain-line exceeds that of the
money-line, and net utility peaks. At each stage in that zone, it is indeterminate whether
this turning point has not yet been reached (ST should advance), is at hand (ST should stop),
or has already been passed (ST should stop, and retreat if possible). Each point in the zone
is borderline-optimal, and none is determinately superior to any other.
So if ST stops in that penumbra, it is indeterminate whether she maximizes utility.
But if ST stops outside the zone, then it is determinately false that shemaximizes utility.
If she stops beforehand, then she could have done better by advancing further; if she stops
afterwards, then it is determinate that she has gone too far. For each point outside the
borderline-zone, there is determinately a point within that zone with higher utility.
Plausibly, if her options are (i) make it indeterminate whether she maximises utility,
or (ii) make it determinate that she does not, then she ought to (i). This is not in general
true—if one can either make it indeterminate whether one gets 100 or 10 utils, or determi-
nate that one gets you get 80 utils, then one ought to do the latter—but the ‘aggregative’
considerations that ground exceptions don’t seem to apply here.18 If she ought to make it
indeterminate whether she maximizes in this manner, then on the sorites account, the Self-
Torturer is akin to an indeterminist Ass of Buridan: she should simply pick some point in
the second zone.
None of this amounts to a general account of the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. In par-
ticular, the issue that we set aside at the beginning—the apparent imperceptibility of the
torture-increments—poses trouble for any view. If the increase in electrical current is gen-
uinely imperceptible, then it is hard to see how refusing an extra $10,000 could ever be jus-
tified: pain is only bad because it feels bad, and if the difference is imperceptible then one
feels no worse after accepting the money.
The central question iswhether it is really coherent to suggest that the adjacent settings
are indiscriminable: together with the claim that indiscriminability is transitive, it leads to
the particularly nasty phenomenal sorites. Phenomenal sorites can be constructed for all kinds
of predicates, with ‘is loud’, ‘is red’, and ‘is cold’ being particularly common examples. So
18For a representative denial that such aggregation can be justified, see Williams (2014).
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the move to the perceptible case—not only in this discussion, but also in that of Tenenbaum
and Raffman19—was a substantial weakening of the Puzzle. A full account of ST’s plight
has not been provided here or elsewhere, in terms of the sorites or ortherwise.
Nevertheless, Tenenbaum andRaffman have failed to show that the challenge of vague
projects to orthodox rational choice theory is not, as they put it, ‘just an especially pic-
turesque instance’ of the sorites.
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